The necessity of multi-disciplinary scholarship for finance: On Ayache and Roffe by Johnson, Timothy C.
The necessity of multi-disciplinary
scholarship for finance: On Ayache
and Roffe
Corresponding author:
Timothy C. Johnson, Department of Actuarial Mathematics and Statistics, Heriot-Watt University, Edinburgh EH14
4AS, UK. Email: t.c.johnson@hw.ac.uk
Timothy C. Johnson
Heriot-Watt University, UK
Elie Ayache, The Medium of Contingency: An Inverse View of the Market, London, Palgrave Macmillan,
2015, 414 pp., $50.00 (hbk), ISBN 978-1-137-28654-3
Jon Roffe, Abstract Market Theory, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, 180 pp., $100.00 (hbk), ISBN
978-1-137-51174-4
Abstract
Ayache presents a view of markets and mathematics that attempts to conform to the
philosophies of Alain Badiou and Quentin Meillassoux. However, this attempt is unsuccessful
because Ayache adopts a view of probability rooted in nineteenth-century conceptions that
cannot accommodate the radical uncertainty of the markets. This is unfortunate as it is
reasonable to believe that the ideas of Badiou and Meillassoux, when synthesised with
contemporary ideas of probability, could offer interesting insights. Roffe presents a better
argued synthesis of Deleuze and markets, however he makes similar assumptions about
contemporary probability that undermine his conclusions.
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Introduction
At the Congress of the Bachelier Finance Society in 2008 Steven Shreve, in his presidential
address, argued that financial mathematicians would emigrate from mathematics
departments, just as computer scientists had, because financial mathematics is essentially a
multi-disciplinary area while mathematics is protective of its distinctive culture. Finance is
quite clearly a social phenomenon, and so is far removed from the usual subjects of applied
mathematics. Financial mathematicians cannot rely on the immutability of physical laws or the
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never claim to be indubitable, it nonetheless can provide insights into how society should
respond to uncertainty.
Although mathematics has a strong culture, it is not a monoculture. The general
conception is that mathematics provides a mechanism for calculating the correct result. This
is the view of non-mathematicians, and is dismissed by the aphorism ‘There are three types of
mathematicians; those that can count and those that can’t’. More popular amongst
mathematicians is the idea that mathematics is concerned with Platonic forms, and so a
mathematical truth is a universal truth. Bourbaki’s expulsion of diagrams from textbooks was
a manifestation of this view and resulted in a breakdown of relations between Western
mathematicians and physicists in the 1970s. There is a third tradition in mathematics, which
accepts that mathematics is constructed (see Poincaré and Gould, 2001); 1+1 was not equal
to 2 at the time of the dinosaurs because the dinosaurs did not speak. One aspect of this
tradition is that the value of mathematics is in delivering proof where experimentation is not
possible. A mathematician ‘discovered’ the Higgs boson particle before the Large Hadron
Collider was constructed, and mathematics is essential in the markets because there is no
consistency in social laws that would enable experimentation. In this tradition, mathematics is
not about objects but the relationships between objects, which are discerned through a
process of abstraction and generalisation. The mathematician, a theorem-prover as distinct
from a calculator, gains perspective by pulling away from the detail, something that can be
hard to grasp for scientists who either value the instrumental aspect of mathematics in
calculation or admire the ethereal nature of mathematics in identifying ideal forms.
Elie Ayache’s critique of probability theory, presented in The Medium of Contingency, is
rooted in the mind-set of an instrumental user, not a creator, of mathematics who genuflects
to the supposed power of mathematics in delivering universal Truths. His book seems
oblivious to what abstract mathematics has achieved in trying to identify the essential nature
of markets. The book will have its admirers, particularly amongst the cohort of ‘quants’ who
graduated from physics and applied mathematics to the markets in the 1980s and then saw
the partial-differential equations that they were expert in replaced by measure theoretic
probability through the 1990s. Its usefulness to readers with a background in social and
human sciences, however, is limited and potentially misleading.
The medium of contingency
Ayache’s book aims to introduce a new metaphysical ‘matter’ pertinent to financial markets.
What it does is present how his experience of the markets has changed his conception of
probability theory, rather than offering a well-founded critique of contemporary probability
theory (xiii-xv). The book offers no new insights to inform derivative pricing, theory or
technology, since the ideas he presents as innovative are, in fact, conventional. For example,
one of the conclusive statements is:
Another formulation of the recalibration problem is the fundamental principle according to which states of
the world in the market are prices, all the prices and nothing but the prices (i.e. they are not abstract states
of the world). You cannot couch this principle in a probabilistic theoretical framework. (363)
The first sentence is well known, understood and uncontroversial. The second is wrong as
contemporary financial mathematics, in theory and in practice, defines events in terms of
prices in a probabilistic theoretical framework. This contradiction arises because Ayache’s
understanding of probability theory seems to be rooted in a conception of probability employed
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in the physical sciences, and he does not appear to grasp the full implications of the measure
theoretic probability upon which mathematical theories of asset pricing are constructed. As a
consequence, he is unable to draw clear connections with the philosophies of Alain Badiou
and Quentin Meillassoux that would have been worthwhile, and which are present in the
background throughout the book. Jon Roffe employs these apparent connections in his book
Abstract Market Theory. Without commenting in detail on Roffe’s analysis, its weakness rests
on an overreliance on Ayache’s flawed understanding of probability theory, which is the focus
of this review.
The foundations of probability
Ayache’s argument is based substantially on measure theoretic probability, which was
developed by Andrei Kolmogorov and presented in its full form in his 1933 Foundations of the
Theory of Probability. Both Ayache and Roffe emphasise the importance of mathematical
formalism, implying its significance in modern probability theory, but Kolmogorov is generally
regarded as being of the intuitionist school, characterised by Poincaré, where mathematics is
motivated by observed phenomena rather than the abstract “game played according to certain
simple rules with meaningless marks on paper” of Hilbert and Bourbaki (Kendall et al., 1990:
63).
The Foundations was contingent, in the sense that it occurred when different streams
came together. The background was that Kolmogorov had established his international
reputation as a mathematician in 1922 when, and at the end of the Russian Civil War, he
produced a significant result in functional analysis. He received his doctorate in 1929 having
published 18 papers on mathematics, and was sent to France and Germany returning to
Moscow, as a Professor of Mathematics, in 1931. Kolmogorov became interested in probability
as he left on his trip abroad.
Kolmogorov’s decision was made in a cultural context. In 1927, Russell (2009: 220)
observed that “opinions differ” when it comes to what is meant by probability, highlighting a
philosophical void at the heart of science. Meanwhile, mathematics had undergone a
paradigm shift with Cantor’s introduction of algebraic set theory in a series of papers between
1874-1884. While most mathematicians embraced Cantor’s theory, and its transfinite
numbers, many Marxist mathematicians, such as Struik and Brouwer, rejected proofs that
relied on ‘ideal’ entities that had no physical manifestation. In 1930 Kolmogorov’s doctoral
supervisor, Nikolai Luzin, was criticised for being too abstract and bourgeois in this context,
and he would be criminally convicted for such crimes in 1936. Kolmogorov might have been
sensitive to these issues, and since probability had been an important topic in Russian
mathematics (but rather peripheral in France and Germany at the time), deciding to focus on
the subject could have been regarded as choosing to concentrate on ‘Soviet’ mathematics.
Cantor’s work related directly to algebra and analysis (the synthesis of geometry and
algebra that started in the seventeenth century and incorporates calculus) and the leading
French mathematicians, Lebesgue and Borel, were central to developing measure theory in
this context. Kolmogorov recast probability theory on this basis and in the spirit of the
(dangerously idealistic) Hilbert Program, which sought to lay sound foundations for
mathematics. The Programme would collapse with Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems of 1931.
In the late 1920s there were two distinctive approaches to probability: the frequentist
approach rooted in physical sciences, and the subjectivist approach grounded in the social
sciences.
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Problems with the conventional, frequentist approach to probability based on counting
relative frequencies became apparent with the turn to probability in physics. In 1890, Poincaré
had won King Oscar’s prize addressing the stability of the solar system by proving that any
physical system confined to a finite space with fixed total energy (as the universe is assumed
to be) must eventually return arbitrarily close to its initial state. This result implied the universe
‘recurs’, and was picked up by those interested in Nietzsche’s discussion of ‘eternal
recurrence’ in Die fröhliche Wissenschaft (1882). The issue for physics was that, in the context
of the probability theory of the time, this result led to the implication that time was reversible
and the second law of thermodynamics was broken. Better known today is the impact of
quantum physics. At the end of the nineteenth century, continuous phenomena in physics
were regarded as deterministic, while discrete phenomena were seen as random (von Plato,
1994: 135-136). The identification of discrete energy states in 1877 resulted in Planck’s
1900 quantum hypothesis and the idea of discrete time and length. This discretisation
suggested that the laws of physics were probabilistic and not deterministic.1
The most sophisticated attempt to address the problem of probability from the physical
sciences came from Richard von Mises, an Austrian engineer linked to the Vienna Circle of
logical-positivists, who attempted to lay down the axioms of probability based on observable
facts. The result was published in German in 1931 and popularised in English as Probability,
Statistics and Truth, now regarded as the main justification for the frequentist approach to
probability based on the principle of indeterminism and related to Laplace’s demon, placing it
within Platonic realism.
Meanwhile, economics was similarly challenging the conventional approach to probability.
Frank Knight, in Risk Uncertainty and Profit (1921), took the view that economics had
developed a theory of competition that brought the value (price) of economic goods to equality
with their cost. However, this equality was in fact only an ‘occasional accident’. Profit (and loss)
in economic affairs was a radically uncertain event (Knightian uncertainty) that was not
amenable to analysis based on ‘risk’ (i.e. known probabilities). Knight argued, from the
perspective of institutional economics, that if uncertainty did not dominate chance then all
prices would be known and the entrepreneur would be redundant: there would be no ‘free will’
in economics. Simultaneously, in his Treatise on Probability, John Maynard Keynes observed
that in some cases cardinal probabilities could be deduced. In others, ordinal probabilities —
one event was more or less likely than another, an intensive magnitude — could be inferred,
but there were a large class of problems that were not reducible to the concept of probability.
In time, Keynes, like Knight, would place uncertainty at the heart of his economics.
Frank Ramsey challenged Keynes in his book Truth and Probability (1926), which argued
that probability relations exist between a premise and a conclusion. Ramsey defines
‘probability’ in the subjective sense of ‘a degree of belief’, which can be established through a
(betting) market. Keynes, a friend and mentor of Ramsey, appears to have been satisfied with
the argument but whether it is true, as claimed by many modern economists, that Ramsey
justifies rational expectations is open to investigation. Ramsey’s approach is better known
through the Italian actuary Bruno de Finetti and the American statistician Leonard Savage.
Collectively, these approaches are considered subjectivist or Bayesian, pointing to their
relationship to the eighteenth-century Bayes’ Rule.
Kolmogorov lays the foundations of probability by equating probability with a measure of
an event. A random variable is a mapping from an event space to a number, and this means
that a mathematical expectation becomes an integral of the random variable, over all
outcomes, and with respect to the probability measure. On this basis, Kolmogorov is able to
derive both the Law of Large Numbers, fundamental to the frequentist conception of
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probability, and Bayes’ Rule, fundamental to the subjectivist conception. This is good
mathematics for a number of reasons. It abstracts from the specific phenomena of interest to
von Mises or Bayes into functional analysis and, in so doing, the fundamental relations of
probability are identified. This generalisation leads to the synthesis of the physical and social
sciences’ approaches to probability; the mathematical method is to abstract in order to
generalise and identify connections. Also, the theory is parsimonious – Kolmogorov does not
appear to add anything new other than present probability as a branch of analysis; he applies
well-developed theory in a different domain in a clear and easy to follow manner.
One of Ayache’s central arguments is that mathematical probability theory fails because
it cannot identify all possible states of the world. For example, ex ante we cannot account for
“The radically-emergent event [that] is not part of a previous range of possibilities” (19).
However, Ayache does not appear to distinguish between a state of the world and an event, as
probability theory does.
Probability theory starts with a ‘sample space’ that represents all possible states of the
future world. The sample space is a set whose elements include outcomes such as ‘9/11’, ‘an
asteroid hits New York on 23 November 2020’, ‘a contingent claim is written on 11 September
2001 to pay-out on 11 September 2021 is lost on 23 November 2020’, and so forth. It should
be obvious that it is impossible to identify all the possible outcomes, and mathematics realises
this; probability theory is not extensional. Mathematics gets around this issue by augmenting
the sample space with what is colloquially known as an ‘event space’. The pair of an
(unmeasurable) sample space augmented with an event space is a ‘measurable space’, and
has been the foundation of functional analysis since at least 1901 when Lebesgue introduced
his integral.
Kolmogorov identified a random variable as a mapping from an event space (not a
sample space) because it involves a specific property: it takes us from the event space to a
number but also it must be able to take us from a specific number to a specific event. In
particular, we are unable to distinguish outcomes that map onto the same number. For
example, consider the random variable that represents the value of a traded asset. The event
that maps onto a price of ‘0’ could be made up of outcomes such as ‘an asteroid hits New
York on 23 November 2020’, ‘a contingent claim written on 11 September 2001 to pay-out on
11 September 2021 is lost on 23 November 2020’, and so on. Because these outcomes lead
to the same value of the random variable (the same price in this context), mathematics does
not have to, and cannot, distinguish the different outcomes as different events. Clearly the
sample space can include outcomes that are inconceivable ex ante and so are technically
immeasurable. Mathematics handles this by focusing not on the sample space but on the
measurable event space. In the case of asset prices, the problem is, in fact, straightforward.
Since the possible future price of an asset is an element of a finite set,2 there are a finite
number of possible events that are relevant to asset prices and so could be defined
extensionally.
Sets of measure zero
Ayache’s argument also highlights issues with (his conception of) sets of measure zero. The
most obvious measure of a set is to count its elements, as in the classical frequentist
approach to probability. For example, I might have a set of drawings comprising of my own
doodles and those of my young children. I could measure the events defined by my own and
my children’s drawings by counting them. The paradigm shift that Kolmogorov initiated
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consists in associating a probability with an abstract measure, freeing probability theory from
being shackled to concepts rooted in counting elements of sets. Using Kolmogorov’s
formulation of probability, I could measure the events by considering the area of the drawings,
another physical measure, in which case the measure of one large picture of my daughter
could exceed the dozen smaller drawings of my son.
To fully grasp the meaning of sets of measure zero, consider the situation if I were an art
dealer. It is conceivable that I would measure the pictures in my collection by the value I
believe they would achieve at public auction, not by the physical measures of number or size.
In this case it might turn out that the events of paintings by my children would have measure
zero.
This simple example suggests that Ayache’s statement at the start of this argument
betrays a serious misunderstanding of this fundamental idea:
For this reason, such events are neither ‘improbable’ nor ‘extremely improbable’. They are not even
‘impossible’ what probability theory characterizes as events of measure 0. They are literally
immeasurable. I call them im-possible, to emphasize the fact that they are external to the whole regime of
possibility. (19)
In assigning a measure of zero to my children’s pictures, I am in no way implying that my
children’s pictures are ‘im-possible’. It might come to pass that my daughter is the world’s
most renowned artist on 23 November 2020, in which case I would change my value-measure
of her work, and mathematics does not inhibit me doing this. In fact, Ayache’s association of
sets of measure zero with ‘im-possibility’ is precisely the misconception that led nineteenth-
century scientists to believe that time was reversible and suggests a mind-set locked into the
classical, frequentist conception of probability.
Ayache develops his beliefs in the context of Nassim Taleb’s (2007) idea of the ‘Black
Swan’ event. His purpose is to undermine Taleb’s assertion that we cannot use probability to
determine the price of an asset in order to advance his own thesis that the issue is not in
pricing technology, but with pricing theory. In criticising probability, rather than its application
in derivative pricing, Ayache is taking on a greater challenge than Taleb.
The concept of the ‘Black Swan’ appears in Juvenal’s Satires as an impossibly rare event,
and even St. Augustine noted that while we could imagine a black swan because we have
experienced a swan and the colour black, this does not mean it could exist. Juvenal’s idea
persisted through the ages but recently Taleb (2007: xvii) has more narrowly defined a ‘Black
Swan’ event as one that has a significant impact, and which “lies outside the realm of regular
expectations, because nothing in the past can convincingly point to its possibility” and is
retrospectively justified. In this formulation, Taleb demonstrates his understanding of
probability by distinguishing the random variable (the quantified impact of the event) from the
measure of the event (its probability). Taleb’s third criterion is epistemic and is similar to
Knight’s and Keynes’. In essence, his argument is concerned with our inability to measure the
probability of rare events, even though the ex-ante impossible outcome was clearly
conceivable ex post.
One might think that Ayache is having difficulty expressing himself, and that his issue is
not with mathematics’ inability to handle events subject to inconceivable outcomes but the
inability of users of mathematics to measure the probability of such events. However, Ayache is
clear about where he sees the issue:
The first predicament of probability theory and consequentially its inability to deal with the medium (the
market), lie in identifying the possible states, not in their subsequent probabilistic weighting. (147)
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This “predicament of probability” is a consequence of Ayache’s peculiar conception of
probability theory (that it rests on states not events), rather than it being an issue with the
theory itself. In the mainstream contemporary approach to probability theory, taken by
mathematics in general and Taleb in particular, the problem is with the inability to measure
the probability of the inconceivable outcome that contributes to the event.
Brownian motion
Ayache demonstrates that he is familiar with the details of measure theoretic probability, if not
its meaning, in the context of presenting his own interpretation of probability (104). This is
done by discussing the Law of Large Numbers, when contrasting von Mises interpretation of
probability with Kolmogorov’s, introducing Cournot’s principle and leading to:
a really provocative (perhaps even revolutionary) thought: [...] that the derivatives market – which is real, of
course – may really be the consequence of true, mathematical Brownian motion. (137-38)
This section is very difficult to follow for anyone with more than a superficial understanding of
contemporary probability, and perhaps my confusion explains why I find a later statement –
that “The market of contingent claims is not the consequence of the mathematical model”
(298) – contradictory to this earlier one. My immediate concern is that Ayache has argued the
case for the ‘radically emergent event’, which is not controversial given Knight and Keynes.
However he argues that the derivatives market, dominated by radical uncertainty, is a
‘consequence’ of Brownian motion. The problem is that, from the perspective of mathematics,
Brownian motion is not that uncertain.
Brownian motion is a physical phenomenon: the independent motion of inanimate pollen
grains. It was a subject of widespread discussion in the nineteenth century and the economist
William Stanley Jevons believed that the phenomena was electrical, calling it pedesis, and
made the suggestion that it could be addressed using probability theory (Brush, 1976: 665). It
became a fundamental object in physics when it was the subject of one of four papers
published in Annalen der Physik by Einstein in 1905, his annus mirabilis. Einstein’s objective
was to explain the behaviour of liquids and solids in terms of the motion of atoms and
molecules; it was a proof of the existence of atoms.
There is a view that Bachelier had pre-empted Einstein, but since their objectives were
very different it is difficult to justify, not least since Bachelier never referred to the
phenomenon. Bachelier was developing an idea that goes back to the origins of mathematical
probability – the idea that a price follows a random walk. This was central to the canonical
foundation of mathematical probability in the 1654 correspondence between Pascal and
Fermat, which, in modern terms, addresses the pricing of a digital option on a binomial tree. In
the mid-nineteenth century, the French financier, Regnault, used the binomial tree as the
foundation of his Calcul des Chances et Philosophie de la Bourse (1863) (Jovanovic and Le
Gall, 2001). It was in this long tradition that Bachelier wrote his 1900 Théorie de la
Spéculation, where he developed Regnault’s discrete time model into a continuous time
model (compare this to how Cox-Ross-Rubinstein discretised Black-Scholes-Merton in the late
1970s, making it more accessible). Bachelier’s approach was not unique at the time;
independently, in 1908, Vincent Bronzin published a text using the same basic price model to
price derivatives (Zimmermann and Hafner, 2007).
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Ayache highlights the difference between the physical phenomenon of Brownian motion
and the context Bachelier was working in when he asserts “Price is perfect for Brownian
motion” (301). However, a standard criticism of the use of Brownian motion in finance is that it
is a continuous process, whereas price processes are not, because the only possible price of
an asset is discrete. Brownian motion is a useful model of prices and as such it has the same
limitations as a sketch of a body has in guiding a brain surgeon. Ayache gets around this
problem by putting the cart before the horse, presenting price as a model of Brownian motion:
Better to say that price is an ideal model of the formal-mathematical Brownian motion, yet as a model and
interpretation of the formalism, there is something material attaching to it. (302)
This step appears to be at the heart of Ayache’s revolutionary argument. Ayache’s point is that
Brownian motion is a Form and price the materialisation of the Form.
The Wiener process is the mathematical object that represents the physical (and
financial) phenomenon, Brownian motion. In 1913, the American Norbert Wiener was awarded
a scholarship to study philosophy at Cambridge. While in Cambridge, Bertrand Russell
suggested he should attend lectures in mathematics and Wiener was introduced to measure
theory. At the end of the First World War, Wiener joined M.I.T. and turned his attention to
specifying, mathematically, Brownian motion.
Imagine that a fly is seen to be on the inside of a window at a certain spot at noon, but ten minutes later
that same fly is sitting on the space bar of a typewriter on a table in the room. During those ten minutes the
fly was buzzing around all over the room while nobody paid attention to it. What are the odds that the fly
touched the ceiling during the intervening ten minutes? (Heims, 1980: 62)
What Wiener realised was that there were an infinite number of directions in which the fly
could leave the window (because directions are continuous), and at each point of its flight, it
could carry on in an infinite number of directions. Wiener needed to measure the relative size
of these infinite numbers of possible paths the fly could take to the typewriter via the ceiling
and compare that to the infinite number of ways the fly could travel from the window to the
typewriter without hitting the ceiling. The problem confronting Wiener was how to construct
this intuition into a well-defined mathematical object.
Wiener solved the problem in 1921 (a decade before Kolmogorov’s Foundations) by
specifying two properties of the Wiener process. Firstly, he states that the problem at each
point was independent of what had happened before; technically the random process
representing the fly’s flight has independently and identically distributed changes. Secondly,
he states that at each point the future location of the fly after a specific interval would have a
Gaussian (Normal) distribution with mean zero and variance given equal to the time interval.
These properties made the apparently unsolvable problem tractable.
If a process is independently and identically distributed, it is ‘stationary ergodic’ and its
statistical properties can be deduced from a single, sufficiently long sample of the process.
Furthermore, because the Wiener process is continuous, it is predictable in the sense that we
can predict it will hit a value if it comes sufficiently close to that value.3 These properties,
inherited by all other processes driven by a Wiener process, are not unimportant; they mean
that ideas such as dynamic replication, in finance, and stochastic control, in general, can be
developed. This would be a much harder task if the process was not continuous and explains
why the Weiner process is used to model discrete price processes. However, the stationary
ergodic property also means that the radically emergent event cannot be accommodated.
Contrary to Ayache’s (113) assertion, Kolmogorov made no assumption of either
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independence or identical distributions in formulating his theory. He only makes the
assumption in the proof of the Law of Large Numbers, making the same assumptions as von
Mises had. Ayache’s argument, that markets are characterised by radical uncertainty (the
radically emergent event) becomes incoherent as soon as he tries to link this theme with the
idea that markets are conceptually related to a process, Brownian motion, which can be
completely described statistically. Ayache argues that Taleb, in focusing on the epistemological
problem, criticises science and, somewhat incoherently, that he also “never really dropped the
frequency or probability-based notion of event” (54). However, in focussing on Brownian
motion, this is exactly what Ayache is doing.
This flaw is not peripheral. For example, his discussion of recalibration (30-35) does not
appear to realise that recalibration is a necessity because the pricing model is stationary
ergodic whereas the market, generating radically emergent events, is not stationary ergodic.
Ayache needs to explain how, if price is the manifestation of Brownian motion, prices can
manifest the radically emergent event. He might argue that the solution lies in a regime-
switching model (30-32), but I would contend the issue is more fundamental: that the
markets, in reality, cannot be associated with any stationary ergodic processes, on which he
bases his subsequent arguments. My impression is that Ayache has an ideological
commitment to a conception of probability rooted in the physical sciences. His response to the
challenge that his experience of markets makes to this ideology is to project it onto measure
theoretic probability. Instead of recognising the fault in his own understanding, and rather than
engaging with the well-established and rigorously tested theory, he seeks to argue for “The End
of Probability”.
Financial mathematics
Moving from probability theory to the financial application, there is a similar lack of clarity that
implies a lack of understanding in Ayache’s discussion of incomplete and complete markets.
Financial mathematics, in both its theory and practice, is built on the ideas of replication and
an absence of arbitrage. Pricing on the basis of an absence of arbitrage is an ancient concept.
It is the idea that asset prices should be coherent in the sense that trading cannot deliver a
sure profit. It is explained in Fibonacci’s 1202 text on commercial arithmetic, the Liber Abici; it
is the basis of Black and Scholes’ (1973: 637) argument, which opens with the statement “It
should not be possible to make sure profits”; and it is central to all contemporary financial
mathematics in the identification of a risk-neutral pricing measure and an absence of
arbitrage in the Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing.
The idea of dynamic replication follows immediately from the principle of no arbitrage and
was not “first shown”, as asserted by Ayache (285), in the formulation of Black-Scholes-Merton
(BSM) model. It was employed by Jan de Witt in his 1671 paper, The Worth of Life Annuities in
Proportion to Redeemable Bonds. Bronzin also employed the technique in 1908 when pricing
derivatives by ‘covering’ or hedging them with portfolios of other assets on the basis of
‘equivalence’ (Zimmermann and Hafner, 2007).
The BSM approach to pricing presents a replication argument that is a consequence of
the continuity of the Wiener process, which delivers a deterministic function of five observable
parameters to give a derivative’s price. This removal of uncertainty in pricing options by BSM
had a particular, important, effect: it meant that trading financial options was not illegal
gambling, since there was, apparently, no randomness in the activity. The sociologist, Donald
MacKenzie, discussed its effect with the legal counsel to the Chicago Board Options Exchange,
Burton Rissman, when the formula emerged. Rissmann made the point that:
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Black-Scholes was what really enabled the exchange to thrive … we were faced in the late 60s and early
70s with the issue of gambling. That fell away, and I think Black-Scholes made it fall away. It wasn’t
speculation or gambling it was efficient pricing ... I never hear the word ‘gambling’ again in relation to stock
options traded on the Chicago Board Options Exchange. (MacKenzie, 2008: 158)
BSM delivers a unique, deterministic price because the Wiener process is stationary
ergodic with continuous paths; it represents a complete market that involves Knight’s ‘risk’ but
not radical uncertainty.
When asset prices are modelled by stationary ergodic processes that are not continuous,
we lose the ability to construct a replication argument. This does not mean the market now
contains arbitrage, just that we cannot identify a unique strategy that precludes arbitrage and
replicates a claim’s pay-off. In this case the market is incomplete; we cannot identify a unique
pricing measure and hence a unique price of an asset. We are still in the world of Knight’s
‘risk’ if our models are based on stationary ergodic processes, but we lose the uniqueness of a
model’s output and so the price is uncertain and the entrepreneur is not redundant. This
account is standard, but Ayache ignores it when he argues that since there is a single price in
a market and, given his account, “[BSM] is the start of something different where talk of
incomplete or complete market becomes spurious, and even dishonest” (270).
How Ayache conceives of a market, which delivers ‘unique’ prices, is interesting if not
perplexing. In Ayache’s presentation ‘the market’ resembles a ticker-tape machine that
informs the reader what the price of an asset is at that time (268-72). Nothing is said as to
how the machine works. In order to appreciate the limitations of this approach, let me be
explicit: when financial markets set a price they do so in a discursive manner.4 A market-maker
will make an assertion as to the price of an asset by giving the market a bid and offer price. If
the other traders agree with the bid-offer, they let it pass and do nothing. If, however, another
trader feels the market-maker has mispriced the asset, they will act — challenging the
assertion — by executing a trade and a price is recorded based on the transaction.5 In such a
set up, recorded prices represent not a belief in the price quoted by the market-maker, but a
disbelief in the market-makers valuation (since they would not trade if they agreed with the
market-maker). The market represents a discursive arena wherein market-makers make
claims as to what is a true price of an asset is. These claims are challenged by other traders
taking the prices, and it is through this process that the market seeks to converge on the Truth
of an asset price. However, the Truth, like the gold at the end of the rainbow, is always one step
away, since the false-pricings, evidenced by the stream of quotes, never cease. So, when
Ayache justifies his arguments on the basis that the market delivers unique prices, he passes
over the fact that the market is made up of wilful participants and a quoted price is a disputed
price.
Ayache moves on and creates a distinction between a contingent claim (the contract) and
a contingent pay-off, which he associates with the output of the BSM model (285-286). He
stresses that Harrison and Pliska (1981, 1983) do not explicitly make this distinction. In the
conventional understanding, a contingent pay-off is an input to the model. It is the random
variable representing the pay-out (contingent on events) that needs to be delivered (attained)
in the uncertain future under the terms of the contract. The contract defines the pay-off. This
distinction is implicit in Harrison and Kreps (1979) and Harrison and Pliska (1981, 1983),
while Pliska (1997: 112) explicitly defines a contingent claim as a random variable. Ayache
argues that there is “equivocation” (286) in Harrison and Pliska’s lack of distinction, but I
believe the ambiguity derives from Ayache’s misunderstanding of what Harrison, Kreps and
Pliska aim to achieve, as well as how they do it.
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In the course of this exposition, Ayache introduces the work of Shafer and Vovk (2001),
who construct a theory of probability based on game theory rather than measure theory. In
their book Probability and Finance, an essential point is that probability is derived from quoted
prices, not from sets of outcomes. Shafer and Vovk point out that their approach, based on
dynamic replication and the exclusion of arbitrage, is more in tune with the origins of
mathematical probability than abstract measure theory.
This is not innovative; Ramsey argued that prices in a betting market gave probabilities,
while both Hald (1990: 69-70) and Sylla (2006: 28), in their accounts of the early
development of probability, describe how in the first text on mathematical probability, Huygens
formulated the classical theory of probability on the basis of calculating the price of a mixture.
Nor is it controversial; it is explicit in all contemporary mathematical finance that the
probabilities used in pricing are derived directly from prices. In modern financial mathematics,
prices are logically anterior to probabilities. This is apparent in the simplest asset-pricing
framework, the single period binomial model that generates the BSM framework.
This model consists of three prices for the underlying asset: the current price and two
possible values of the asset at a specified time in the future. For the market to preclude
arbitrage, the current price must lie between the lower and upper future prices. This presents
a simple geometric interpretation of the probabilities; they indicate where the current price lies
in between the future prices. In more complex cases, the binary choice of prices is replaced
with a distribution of future prices. In the BSM framework, the prices are log-normally
distributed with mean defined by the riskless-rate of interest and the variance by the
‘volatility’. Volatility ‘smiles’ and ‘skews’ tell traders how the market prices diverge from the
model distribution, or equivalently how markets assess the probabilities of different prices
materialising, and recalibration occurs because the distribution of the future price of the
underlying asset evolves in a manner impossible to know.
The ‘underlying’ asset defines the market geometry on which all contingent claims based
on the underlying must be priced. The mathematical theory of derivative pricing has nothing to
say as to the efficient allocation of scarce resources or about predicting the future. It is only
concerned with coherent pricing of assets such that an arbitrage is not possible. This comes
as somewhat of a disappointment to many who believe that mathematics can, somehow,
identify the ‘true’ price of an asset or provide a technique to predict the future. This approach
is observed in practice, for example, by Beunza and Stark (2012: 391), who make it explicit
that traders convert prices into probabilities.
Shafer and Vovk’s contribution is a realisation that in the markets (and their account is
specific to probability in finance), mathematicians are dealing not with a frequentist or
subjective version of probability, where the expected value is contingent and might never be
realised, but a prescriptive version, where you must price by the risk-neutral, geometric,
probabilities. The problem for financial mathematics, according to Shafer and Vovk’s
approach, is not that it is discordant with the mainstream but that it is focused on the
particular, and mathematicians prefer general to particular frameworks. Measure theory
incorporates the frequentist (von Mises), subjective (Ramsey, de Finetti, Savage) and financial
(Shafer and Vovk) conceptions of probability, hence it is to be preferred. The achievement of
Harrison, Kreps and Pliska was in representing the approach developed in BSM in terms of
measure theory. The benefit of this was immediately apparent to the theorists. There had
always been a dissonance between the Black-Scholes approach, rooted in the Capital Asset
Pricing Model, and Merton’s, rooted in stochastic calculus (Johnson, 2015b: 52-53). The
connection between the two approaches became apparent in the ‘Radon-Nikodym derivative’
central to Harrison, Kreps and Pliska’s efforts.
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There is, however, another issue with Ayache appealing to Shafer and Vovk connected to
the Cournot principle, which argues that small probabilities should be ignored. As such it is
inconsistent with Ayache’s assertion that the problem with probability is in not being able to
measure the ‘im-possible’ event. It is worth noting that the origin of Cournot’s principle is in
the discussion of the Petersburg game, which was prominent in the eighteenth century when
the financial (Huygens, Bernoulli) and classical (de Moivre, Montmort) conceptions of
probability were debated. Cournot’s principle was displaced by the concept of utility only in the
mid-twentieth century.
While Ayache’s knowledge of probability theory is out of date and consequently his
understanding of financial mathematics is flawed, the closing stages of The Medium of
Contingency are the least problematic from a mathematical point of view. The essence of what
Ayache is saying, that price is anterior to probability and that models need to be re-calibrated if
based on stationary ergodic processes, is conventional. There are still difficulties, though,
when Ayache claims: “Price has everything to do with volatility (price is local) and nothing to do
with probability or the long run” (326). This is misguided because volatility has everything to do
with probability in financial mathematics, and is now used as a proxy for probability. The
statement is informative in that it highlights the central issue with Ayache’s account: his
conception of probability seems to be is based on what he was formally taught and relates to
the conception of probability rooted in the physical sciences. His experiences in the markets
challenge this conception, pointing to a more subjectivist view. However financial mathematics
points to a third conception, that probability derives from price and that prices represent
events. None of this is controversial. The problem with Ayache’s argument is not in its end-
point but that it is built on a peculiar conception of measure theory that leads him to create
straw men, which he demolishes with gusto, only to arrive at an uncontroversial position that
was there at the very origins of mathematical probability. His conclusive statements (363-364)
reflect this, being a mixture of the obvious and the incorrect, as I have highlighted above.
Measure theory provides financial mathematicians with a sophisticated toolbox that
enables them to discern something of the nature of markets. It is not the job, or even the
aspiration, of financial mathematicians to determine the ‘true’ price of assets (Johnson, 2011;
2015a). Mathematics tells us that if asset prices in a market were deterministic functions
(derivatives) of a continuous stationary ergodic processes (the underlying asset) and the
market does not admit arbitrage opportunities (opportunities to generate a risk-less profit),
then there is a unique, indisputable, price for those assets. If asset prices are deterministic
functions of dis-continuous stationary ergodic processes, we no longer have a unique price for
the assets, though we still know the distribution of the underlying asset and so can make
informed decisions as to the prices of derivative assets (Cont and Tankov, 2004: Section
10.5.2). In the case of real markets, where the driving asset prices are not given by stationary
ergodic processes, we have the tools of measure theory to use to search for results. One
current initiative is to develop pricing models without having to specify how an asset price
evolves; rather, the input is quoted asset prices, for example as described in Hobson (2011).
This is the response of mathematics to the well-known issues that Ayache highlights, which
leaves me thinking that Ayache’s thinking is out-dated.
Abstract market theory
The weakness in Ayache’s argument derives from its narrow basis in the literature. Ayache
seems oblivious to recent scholarship investigating the pre-Laplacian development of
probability or the pricing of derivatives before Bachelier that render his account banal.
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Ayache’s account is of interest because of the links he draws to contemporary French
philosophy, notably Badiou and Meillassoux. However, since his account of the mathematical
theory is so weak, it is difficult to see how firm connections can really be made. Yet it is
precisely through these connections that Jon Roffe employs Ayache in his book Abstract
Market Theory. Roffe’s book presents a shorter, clearer argument that approaches ‘the
market’ from the standpoint of French philosophy. This is a line similar to Ole Bjerg’s Making
Money (2014), where Slavoj Žižek, rather than Deleuze, Badiou, and Meillassoux, provides the
framework. While Roffe’s argument is well presented, it conveys the impression that it is
principally a work of hermeneutics, a feature shared with Bjerg’s book, which does not actually
get to grips with the actual phenomenon of ‘the market’.
In particular, while Roffe aims to “philosophically engage with the question of the market,
a central yet neglected object of economics, on non-economic grounds” (3), the basis of his
understanding of markets comes from a few principal sources: Ayache, Taleb, Fama and
Graeber. The result of the imbalance between source materials and analytic methods is that,
after around 150 pages of analysis, Roffe presents the reader with 26 Propositions. One would
have hoped to get to something more concrete than a collection of statements with no
suggestion that they might, justifiably, be elevated to Conjectures. For example, the second
proposition – “Probability and its root possibility are incoherent concepts that rely on
incompatible logical and temporal predispositions” (21) – seems to be based on Ayache’s
arguments, arguments that as a probabilist I find fundamentally flawed.
Technically I think Roffe’s line is weak. In his introduction, Roffe (4) states that:
[T]he argument advanced here involves (1) developing a concept of price, (2) developing a concept of the
market, and making clear the nature of the market-price relationship, and (3) with these concepts in hand,
situating in precise terms the regime of the social in relation to that of the market.
Roffe then proceeds by first discussing probability before moving onto prices. The
consequence of this is that we have no clear articulation of what is meant by ‘the market’ until
we are presented with Fama’s definition in relation to the Efficient Markets Hypothesis (123),
which is exactly the same definition that Bjerg (2014: 51) uses. It is not unreasonable for an
abstract theory of the market to travel towards a definition of the market; the problem is that
Fama’s definition is very specific and closely related to the economic definition (the efficient
allocation of scarce resources), which Roffe claims to wish to avoid.
To appreciate the significance of these comments, consider Roffe’s (31-33) discussion of
Ayache’s rejection of Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDOs) as legitimate financial assets.
Contrary to Ayache’s belief, CDOs are not novel inventions. The sixteenth-century Fuggers
employed ‘corpo’ and ‘supracorpo’ structures to bundle their loan portfolio into ‘tranches’ that
were sold to investors (Palmer, 1974: 554; Poitras, 2000: 269), while Mortgage Backed
Securities were introduced in the USA during the nineteenth century (Levy, 2012: Chapter 5).
The issue with CDOs is that they are products manufactured by financial institutions and then
sold, as any other product might be made and sold. Despite being manufactured by financial
institutions they are not widely traded in financial markets. This is why they do not fit into
Ayache’s account.
Conclusion
The financial crises that have occurred since 2007 highlight that the radical uncertainty of
markets demands that we are flexible in our thinking, and that the consequences of ideologies
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that inhibit reflexivity are significant. Steven Shreve’s advice, given at the Bachelier Finance
Society Conference, was that mathematicians must find collaborators in the social sciences
because it is important to view the markets from many perspectives and to search for
connections between different perspectives if we are going to get to grips with finance. The
weakness in Ayache’s argument derives from its narrow basis in the literature. He seems to
relish in ignoring ethnographic and sociological work on markets, and while he might feel
himself to be a competent calculator he has demonstrated that he has no real understanding
of mathematics. Neither Ayache nor Roffe engage with the historical literature. I understand
this approach from the perspective of bankers; it is difficult to justify fat fees if you
acknowledge you are peddling a financial technology, such as securitisation, that was already
present in medieval finance as the triple-contract. I cannot explain why scholarly efforts to
explain the markets ignore history, not least because Roffe is a colleague of James Franklin,
who would have been able to explain that (historically) price is anterior to probability (see
Franklin, 2001).
Ayache’s criticism of measure theoretic probability is rather conventional. Von Mises
(1982: 99) criticised it as unnecessarily complex, while the statistician Maurice Kendall (1949:
102) argued that measure theory fails “to found a theory of probability as a branch of
scientific method”. More recently, the physicist Edwin Jaynes (2003: 655) has described
Leonard Savage’s subjectivism as having a “deeper conceptual foundation which allows it to
be extended to a wider class of applications, required by current problems of science” in
comparison with measure theory. When Shafer and Vovk (2001) proposed their alternative to
measure-theoretic probability they argued that game-theoretic probability “captures the basic
intuitions of probability simply and effectively”. While all these particular expressions of
probability might be locally useful, they do not pull themselves away from the specific issue in
order to gain a general sense of what is going on. Harrison, Kreps and Pliska, in building a
mathematical theory of derivative pricing on the basis of measure theory, did capture the
essence in the Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing, which can be summed up by Black and
Scholes’ famous quip: ‘it should not be possible to make sure profits’. Herein lies the matter
of markets as revealed by mathematics; it is as much a normative as a positive pursuit, with
roots in the scholastic injunction that a riskless profit is turpe lucrum — a shameful gain.
The really disappointing consequence of the limited scholarship that both Ayache and
Roffe rely on is that there might be substantial links between finance and the philosophy of
Badiou and others that are worth exploring. Taleb’s third characteristic of ‘Black Swan’ events,
that they are retrospectively justified, is reminiscent of Engels’ analysis of Hegel: “all that was
previously real becomes unreal, loses its necessity, its right of existence, its rationality” (Engels
et al., 1941: 11). Could there be a relationship between Badiou’s statement “of ‘a’, but also of
‘not a’” (Meillassoux, 2011: 3) and the idea that an event, in measure theory, could relate to
different outcomes in the sample space? But one of the potentially most interesting
correspondences between Badiou and markets is whether Badiou’s point that one can never
be certain of an event having taken place — it relies on the constant re-affirmation through a
“faithful procedure” (Badiou, 2007: Section 35.4) — relates to the market process of traders
challenging each other’s quotes, described above. The relevance is that while Badiou argued
only science and politics (along with art and love) can identify ‘Truth’, there is a growing body
of literature that argues Western concepts related to democracy and science emerged out of
commercial practice (see Hadden, 1994; Kaye, 1998; Seaford, 2004).
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Notes
1. Ayache suggests that the issue is more specific and related to the quantum mechanical wave
function being a meta-probabilistic predictive tool (23). Strictly speaking the square modulus of
the wave function (a complex, not real valued function) can be interpreted as a probability, in the
sense that it represents a density, but it is not a probability as mathematicians conceive of it. This
approach is used as an analogue in explaining quantum mechanics to lay audiences, such as
through the so-called Copenhagen Interpretation. There is a topic, quantum probability, which
creates a mathematical theory of probability in which the wave function does represent a
probability, but this is peripheral even amongst physicists.
2. I argue that the price of any asset must be bounded by a finite multiple of the number of atoms in
the universe, which is bounded. Since all prices must be recordable, the set of possible prices
within this finite bound is finite. The price of an asset is never going to be ‘purple’.
3. When Ayache says “that the next price cannot but be unpredictable, for if it wasn’t it wouldn’t be
the next price, it would be the present price” (316) he cannot understand this fundamental
property of the Weiner process/Brownian motion and still claim there is a significant association
between prices and the Weiner process.
4. This account might be becoming outdated as automated traders replace traditional market-
makers, but it is relevant to Ayache’s argument.
5. Note that the specification of a bid-offer pair by a market-maker is critical; offering to sell air for
£1,000/kg would not demonstrate anything, offering to buy air at £999.95/kg would be
challenged as a mispricing.
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